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The European Community budget is, arguably,
among the least satisfactory elements of EU eco-
nomic governance and one which, moreover, has
proved to be remarkably resistant to change since it
was last subjected to major reform in 1988. In the
intervening period, there has been no radical devel-
opment, despite the increase in membership of the
union from 12 to 27, completion of the internal mar-
ket, and the extension of EU ambitions in external
policy from development to international security.
Monetary union has gone from a distant prospect to
a euro that will be well into its adolescence by the
end of the current Multi-annual Financial Frame-
work (MFF) in 2013,which is formerly known as the
Financial Perspective – FP.
It is noteworthy that in the extensive reform of eco-
nomic governance that took place in 2005, it is the
budget which emerged least altered, despite the fact
that it underwent a presentational makeover that,
for example, saw “structural operations” re-defined
as “cohesion for growth and employment”, albeit
with much the same level of resources. While the
seemingly vast capacity of the EU to fudge deals
cannot be ignored in looking to the future of the
budget, it is hard to see how the present system can
survive beyond the present budgeting period of 2007
to 2013. In an intriguing paradox, the long periods
involved seem to make reform more difficult, rather
than giving ample time for reflection.
It is against this backdrop that the EU is now gear-
ing up for a review of the budget, due to take place
in 2008/2009, and supposed to be subject to no
taboos.All headings of expenditure are to be exam-
ined and the terms of reference also make clear that
the UK rebate is to be on the table, offering some
hope that things might change, despite the disap-
pointing outcome of the 2005 deal (Begg and
Heinemann 2006). Consequently, the review offers
the first opportunity for many years for the EU bud-
get to be re-thought from first principles, at least
selectively. More importantly, it can help to shift the
agenda for what the EU budget should do.
But is there the political will to enable it to be a cat-
alyst for change? This paper describes the flaws in
the budget that the review is intended to address,dis-
cusses options and concludes with a number of pro-
posals for reform.
What is at issue?
There is widespread agreement about the shortcom-
ings of the budget, well-captured in the jibe of Buti
and Nava (2003, 1) that it is a “historical relic”. The
biggest element of expenditure has long been sup-
port for agriculture, a declining sector of economic
activity, while the other major component of spend-
ing is for cohesion: policies aimed mainly at the eco-
nomic development of lower-income regions and
Member States. Together, agricultural and cohesion
have accounted for some three-quarters of EU
spending over the last three decades, including the
1999 to 2006 spending period that has just ended.All
other EU policies, as well as the administrative costs
of the Union compete for the remaining quarter,
equivalent to just one quarter of a percentage point
of EU GDP.
Although many facets of the budget look different
or have acquired new labels, it is striking how little
changed the budget of 2007 is from those of the late
1980s. Some might dispute this assertion, but as
Table 1 shows, in practice the main features have
evolved only to a limited extent. It is still almost the
same size as a proportion of EU GDP;it continues to
be dominated by expenditure on agriculture and
cohesion; and the UK rebate is as hotly contested as
ever. Politically, the most telling change is that there
are now more net contributors than twenty years
ago, but the proliferation of back-door rebates has
made the whole picture more blurred and the solu-
tions found ever more ad hoc.
An important issue is how big the EU budget should
be. Over the last two decades, it has hovered around
1 percent of EU GNI.At this level it is just 2.5 per-
cent of aggregate public spending in the EU which
means that the room for genuine manoeuvre in the
budget is, inevitably, severely circumscribed. Nor
does the budget have any role in stabilisation policy,
as is the norm for the highest tier of policy-making
elsewhere (even in the US, the federal government * London School of Economics.accounts for over 20 percent of GNP), and it does
not explicitly contribute to the re-distribution of
income through social transfers, as might be expect-
ed from the highest level of governance in a fiscal
federation (Oates 1999).That said, the budget plain-
ly does have a distributive effect insofar as it trans-
fers resources to farmers – increasingly, after succes-
sive reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), in the form of direct income subsidies rather
than the much reviled production subsidies – and to
the regions eligible for cohesion spending, in the
form of targeted public investment.
Instead of being a source of EU level public goods,
some critics argue that the budget is dominated by
re-distributive expenditure. Indeed, Blankart and
Kirchner (2003) argue that the institutional arrange-
ments for settling the budget predispose it towards
redistributive policies, echoing the pork barrel men-
tality familiar in the US congress. Moreover, there is
little scope for using straightforward economic prin-
ciples to determine how spending at EU level would
“add value”. Worse, the issue of added value only
rarely surfaces in the acrimonious negotiations
around the budget. Instead the focus of attention
has, especially in the last two settlements (1999 and
2005, although this orientation dates back to the
wielding of the handbag by Mrs. Thatcher in the
early 1980s),been on how much the respective heads
of government and finance ministers have been able
to bring back as a juste retour.As Le Cacheux (2005)
aptly describes it, the obsession with net contribu-
tions “poisons” the whole debate.
Timing and context
There will be three stages to the review: an initial
‘key issues’ paper from the Commission to launch a
period of consultation; the publication of firm pro-
posals by the Commission, probably late in 2008,
drawing on background research and the outcome of
the consultation process; then the usual wrangling
about what should be agreed.It is important,though,
not to harbour illusions about what the 2008/2009
review will change. In particular, it is unlikely to
result in much alteration of the existing MFF – seen
by too many as a ‘done deal’ that cannot be unpicked
thread by thread without the whole garment disinte-
grating.Nor does there seem to be much enthusiasm
for change on the funding side of the budget, not
least because the present system of own resources
that funds the EU budget has one great virtue,
namely that it ensures that the EU obtains the
money it needs.Any switch to a “tax for Europe” or
any other revenue source would create a degree of
uncertainty in this regard.
The rigidities in the system of decision-making (not
least the requirement for unanimity), path depen-
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Table 1 
Budget features compared 
Facet of budget  1988–1992 (FP)  2007–2013 (MFF)  Comment 
Own resources ceiling  Rising to 1.2%  
of GDP 





Planned: 1.17%  
of GNP 
Out-turn: 0.99% 
Planned: 1.05% of GNI  There has been a tendency for 
the out-turn to under-shoot 
Share of CAP spending,  
% end of FP/MFF 
51.4%  32.0% direct payments, 
with an additional 8.2% 
on other elements 
Major changes made in 1992 
and 2002 in the character of the 
CAP, but real level of spending 
maintained 
Share of cohesion 
spending, % by end of 
FP/MFF 
30.2%  35.6%  Shift from “cohesion 4” to 
recently acceded members 
Administration costs, % 
end of FP/MFF 
4.7%  6.0%  Increase partly caused by  
re-definitions 
Formal abatement  UK  UK  Relatively minor changes in 
formula  
Implicit “rebates”  DE  DE, NL, AT, SE  Increasingly messy and opaque 
arrangements 




GNP:   9% (average)
VAT: 16% (2007) 
GNI:  69% (2007) 
Switch from VAT resource to 
GNI resource, but de facto both 
transfers 
Source: Author’s elaboration. CESifo Forum 1/2007 47
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dency and the power of vested interests make
reform of the EU budget an uphill task. There is,
nevertheless, a potentially auspicious conjunction of
scheduling in the next three years. 2009 will see the
end of the mandates of the current Commission and
European Parliament. Under the provisions of the
re-launched Lisbon strategy, new triennial National
Reform Programmes are due to be formulated in
2008 and launched in 2009 and the parallel Com-
munity Lisbon Programme will also need to be
renewed. In addition, there is or is likely to be new
political leadership in key larger Member States. A
“health-check” – which could in effect be a review –
on the CAP is also envisaged. Hence, there is a win-
dow of opportunity for more extensive change than
has been feasible in recent rounds.This suggests that
the principal ambition of the review should be to
shift the terms of the debate for subsequent funding
periods (that is, beyond 2013) and to provide a
roadmap for the reform of the budget.
The revenue side of the budget
Although the Treaty (Art. 269, TEC) stipulates that
the EU should be funded by own resources, only a
small proportion (currently just under 15 percent) of
the revenue comes from instruments that are gen-
uinely European, namely the levies and duties
imposed at European level – the “traditional” own
resources (ToR). Starting in 1979, the bulk of the
EU’s revenue has come from, initially, a proportion
of the proceeds of national value added tax,comple-
mented after 1988 by a fourth resource calibrated on
national income (now GNI). These two resources
are, in a legal sense, own resources because they are
formally incorporated in the Inter-Institutional
Agreement between the European Parliament, the
Commission and the Council. But in an economic
sense, they are inter-governmental transfers, rather
than readily identifiable revenue sources. This has a
number of ramifications.
Because the GNI resource is residual in that it rises
or falls to match the EU’s expenditure commitments,
there is no risk of the EU “running out of money”as
happened in earlier periods.The corollary is that the
major political decisions about the EU budget con-
cern the EU’s expenditure, with the revenue adjust-
ing passively. This is not, as it might be in other cir-
cumstances,a recipe for fiscal laxity,since the overall
cap on the budget, together with the ceilings for dif-
ferent headings of expenditure effectively impose a
hard budget constraint. But it does distinguish the
EU from other governments which have to balance
revenue raising with expenditure in a more system-
atic way. A second feature of the system is that it is
easy to predict how much each Member State will
contribute s a proportion of national income. The
current system is, broadly, proportional, with each
Member State expected ex-ante to pay-in roughly
1 percent of its GNI,although the various abatement
mechanisms alter the actual payments.
What could be on a reform agenda?
The mandate for the reform of the revenue side of
the budget refers to “resources, including the UK
rebate”. The former can be interpreted either as a
call for minor revision of the existing own resources
or, at the other extreme, as an invitation to assign
genuinely “owned” taxes to the EU level. An obvi-
ous simplification of the existing system would be
the abolition of the VAT resource by consolidating it
into the GNI resource, recognising that the distinc-
tion is artificial.
Introducing new taxes for Europe would be much
bolder, yet already seems to be a step too far politi-
cally, despite the fact that it has consistently been on
the EU agenda since the 1988 budget reform. In
interviews, Dalia Grybauskaite, the EU Budget
Commissioner has made clear her opposition to
opening-up this question now,although a report by a
prominent member of the European Parliament
(Lamassoure 2007) has made a strong case for mov-
ing in stages to a new system in which there are
explicit EU taxes. The Commissioner’s fear is, in
part, that if the review attempts to tackle too many
topics, it will succeed with none of them.
Possible criteria for an EU tax include standard tax
principles (including equity – especially between
Member States – economic efficiency, sufficiency
and cost of collection),assurance that the new instru-
ment would not add to the aggregate fiscal burden
(revenue neutrality), and political considerations
such as a link to EU policies, visibility and trans-
parency. No conceivable EU tax will ever be ideal
and there are bound to be problems of various sorts
in any tax that might be envisaged to “pay for Euro-
pe”. But designing one that fulfils enough of the rel-
evant criteria is not an especially daunting challenge
and many conceivable options have been discussed
over the year (see Cattoir 2004; Le Cacheux 2007).
Collecting a tax at EU level may even diminishanomalies or externalities resulting from its collec-
tion at Member State level, such as arbitrariness in
which Member State levies taxes on bases that are in
fact pan-European profits, for example.
The problems arise at the political level. Opponents
of an EU tax claim, inter alia, that:
• It would increase the overall tax burden – which
it plainly would not if revenue neutrality is res-
pected.
• Citizens would question why they were paying for
the EU – which is,in fact precisely the point of the
transparency and visibility argument for having a
tax.
• Introducing a “new”tax is a political non-starter –
a claim which has no empirical support.
• Because the present system of own resources
assures adequate funding, the maxim “if it ain’t
broke,don’t fix it”should apply,especially when a
tax for Europe would inevitably create new prob-
lems and anomalies – a standpoint that has its
merits, but which is also a recipe for inertia.
Expenditure
There are several explanations for the current mix of
spending in the EU, few of which reflect underlying
principles of public finance.The most clear-cut is the
Treaty base which stipulates that there shall be a
common agricultural policy (CAP) and funding for
cohesion through the Structural Funds.However,the
scale of expenditure on these two sets of policies is a
political choice and the way they are distributed
among Member States partly to give “money back”.
There is also a Treaty base for research funding and
various other internal policies,while the Union man-
ifestly could not function without administrative out-
lays.Here,too,the level of expenditure is a matter of
political choice. For other key components of EU
economic governance such as macroeconomic stabil-
isation, the Lisbon reform agenda or sustainable
development, the legal base is much weaker. Yet
with the Commission placing the (Lisbon) Partner-
ship for Growth and Jobs at the heart of its political
work programme,it might have been expected that it
would feature prominently in EU expenditure over
the coming years.
Heading 1 of the 2007 to 2013 MFF is, indeed, iden-
tified as money to be spent on growth and employ-
ment and, in its more sanguine pronouncements, the
Commission claims that as much as 40 percent of the
EU budget is aimed at this objective. However, this
claim can be made only by including the cohesion
budget as part of growth and employment. This is
not without justification insofar as the economic
development of less competitive regions contributes
to aggregate EU competitiveness, but the fact re-
mains that cohesion spending is about countering
the market forces that result in polarisation and is
paid for by, implicitly, taxing richer regions.
But what the budget does not do systematically is to
allocate resources to genuinely European public
goods, for which there is an evident added value
from producing them at supranational problem.
Spill-over arguments could,for example,be adduced
to support EU wide infrastructure networks or
research,and it would not be hard to make a case for
higher spending on internal security.As a result, the
question that ought to be behind that of “how big
should the budget be” namely, “when is it better to
spend at EU level”, is scarcely posed, let alone
answered.
What are fair contributions to the EU budget? 
There are three different ways of measuring how
much each Member States pays in to the EU budget,
each telling a different story: ex-ante gross pay-
ments; payments after allowing for abatements and
other adjustments; and net contributions. All have
become increasingly devoid of principles over the
years because of ad hoc adjustments. Corrections
designed to contain net balances include the “fee”
paid to Member States for collecting the two tradi-
tional own resources (increased to 25 percent in
1999, largely to give money back to the Nether-
lands); differing take-up rates for VAT instead of a
single one; and, in the 2007 to 2013 MFF, a reduced
take-up rate of the GNI resource for the Nether-
lands and Sweden. Together with the formal rebate
for the UK and the reduced contribution to the UK
rebate offered to four Member States (which
increases the burden on the remaining twenty-two),
all of these manipulations mean that the actual pay-
ments to the EU of five of the richer Member States
are, in fact, lower as a proportion of GNI than the
poorer Member States.
The effect of these corrections is to increase the
share of GNI paid-in by other countries.At the rich-
er end of the spectrum, France has had to pay most
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in this regard. But the fact that the recently-acceded
countries also have to pay more has been a source of
dismay. In addition, the payments have to be made
quarterly, whereas receipts from many of the multi-
annual programmes, such as the Structural Funds,
tend only to be received with a lag and are subject to
certain conditions.The upshot is that a country such
as Poland may face a less favourable cash-flow in the
short-term. These revenue arrangements have
caused friction, with the recently acceded Member
States dismayed to find that they have to pay
“upfront” for the British abatement.
Nevertheless, the key issue is net contributions,
which are the difference between abated gross pay-
ments into the EU budget and expenditure received
from it. The net contributions arise almost entirely
on the expenditure side of the budget, albeit for dif-
fering reasons. CAP spending has an uneven geo-
graphical incidence because it automatically favours
countries with large farming industries, while its dis-
tributive impact has – so far – been unpredictable,
favouring large farmers in some circumstances and
low-income ones in others. Cohesion policy is delib-
erately targeted at lower income or competitively
weak regions, and can thus be seen as a policy that
has more explicit equity-related aims. Spending on
other policies reflects diverse objectives. Thus, the
research budget is supposed to be allocated princi-
pally on the basis of excellence, which tends to
favour Member States (and, within them, specific
regions) with well-developed research capacities –
usually richer ones.
Overall, therefore, the distributive impact of the EU
budget is partly intentional and partly a by-product
of the way policies are designed and implemented.
The tension at the core of this system for allocating
spending is that more attention tends to be paid to
how much a country receives rather than whether
the policy is well-conceived from the perspective of
the EU as a whole by producing public goods.
Proposals and conclusions
The 2008/2009 review of the EU budget is an oppor-
tunity to achieve an irreversible shift in the econom-
ics and politics of the EU budget, but success cannot
be taken for granted and it would not be at all sur-
prising if the ended without firm agreement on how
to move forward.There seems little prospect that the
review will result in anything other than marginal
changes in the 2007 to 2013 MFF. But it will have
served its purpose if it establishes a clear and princi-
pled blueprint for the future shape of the budget.
Offering credible ways forward or clarifying the
options in seven key areas would constitute real
progress.They are as follows.
• The rigid ceiling of 1.24 percent of GNI for the
budget, and the de facto ceiling of just over 1 per-
cent should be abandoned in favour of a “policies
first”approach.There is plainly no political will to
endow the EU level with fiscal resources compa-
rable to the federal or central level in other poli-
ties, but that need not preclude a somewhat larg-
er budget, provided that it can be justified. The
current own resources ceiling reinforces the senti-
ment, first, that payments to the EU are tanta-
mount to a club fee and, second, that the primary
objective in budget negotiations should be to
maximise “money back”. In this logic, the main
function of the ceiling is to contain the common-
pool problem and thus limit the distributive trans-
fers from the budget. But in the process, little
thought is given to what public goods the EU
should provide.
• A robust means of showing that there is added
value from funding public goods at the EU level
has to be put in place. This should be based on
analytic concepts, such as externalities and
economies of scale, and adapted to the unique
institutional circumstances of the EU. A key test
should be whether spending at EU level improves
the quality/efficiency trade-off of public spending,
and the presumption should be that assigning a
spending competence to the EU level should
result in either the same or lower level of total
public spending.Where there are reasons (such as
national sensitivities) for retaining a particular
public good at national level,the rationale should
be made explicit.
• A substantial reduction in the share of the CAP
would nevertheless free resources (and, perhaps
more importantly, create political room for
manoeuvre) for other purposes, alter the arith-
metic of net contributions and have a positive
effect on the EU’s position in the Doha Round
negotiations. The details are bound to be con-
tentious, but there are essentially two ways of
achieving the outcome, bearing in mind that an
agricultural policy remains a Treaty commitment:
co-financing of the existing CAP from national
exchequers or further changes in the CAP itself
that reduce its budgetary demands.• A coherent and transparent system for funding the
budget is needed, with an end to ad hoc arrange-
ments. Again, there are two approaches: fund the
budget entirely from intergovernmental transfers
from Member States (with some reflection on
whether fairness should be achieved by keeping
the payments purely proportional or having a
degree of progressivity); or establish “owned”
taxes for Europe.The inter-governmental transfer
approach has the undeniable merit that it works
and (unless the possibility of reneging, as has
occurred sporadically for international organisa-
tions, arises) will continue to work to assure ade-
quate resources. Taxes for Europe would be
messier, but more in keeping with the Treaty and
with accepted norms of accountability.
• Net contributions should no longer be abated.
Instead, it should be incumbent on Member
States to accept that once the major decisions on
expenditure are taken, the distributive conse-
quences should be accepted. Inevitably, this
would lead to Member States holding out for
policies that favour them, but the overall impact
should be to make scrutiny of policies more
intensive.
• If a case can be made for purely re-distributive
transfers among Member States,it might as well be
through an explicit fiscal equalisation. The politi-
cal problems associated with schemes such as the
German Finanzausgleich are well-known, but
they offer a more coherent and politically open
means of settling the question than each finance
ministry showing up for the periodic MFF negoti-
ations with an increasingly elaborate Excel
spreadsheet into which the latest proposals are
fed so as to work out net balances.
• The political and budgetary cycles should be better
aligned. It is an open question whether the opti-
mal combination would be for the budget to be
mid-point to mid-point of the five-yearly cycle for
the Commission and the European Parliament or
precisely aligned.It is difficult to see why the bud-
get should be on a seven-year cycle.
An immediate reaction to this list is sure to be that it
exemplifies the old joke about the economist on a
desert island confronted with a tin of food, who
answers the question “how do we open it?” by stat-
ing “assume a tin opener”. But even if some of the
forgoing proposals seem fanciful, the sceptical read-
er is invited to write down on a blank sheet of paper
what would be included if an EU budget were
designed from first principles. The difficulty facing
the budget is the continuing uncertainty about what
the EU is supposed to be, an uncertainty that makes
it hard to define what sorts of public goods the EU
should provide.The answer may only be implement-
ed a decade or more hence, but will the 2008/2009
review be far-sighted enough to provide a roadmap
to it?
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